Abstract: This paper argues that Hume's claim to have some belief in God is accurate because his own philosophy is held together by a teleological underpinning that leads to the idea of God. Previous work that has favorably connected Hume's philosophy to Kant's provides a framework to argue that Hume inadvertently admits a teleological a priori in understanding nature in the same way that Kant understands teleology as the "lawfulness of the contingent." Having connected Hume and Kant through teleological aesthetics, this paper moves to show how this teleology underwrites several positive statements about God that Hume makes in the Dialogues.
Introduction
"David acknowledged that he had some belief," or at least so reports James Boswell after seeking out a religious conversation with Hume on a Sunday before noon, when Boswell was mysteriously late for church.1 To many people, who have taken the works of this Scottish skeptic and turned them into a manifesto for unbelief, such a claim about Hume, especially a claim made by Hume, is troublesome to their atheistic mindset. The philosophical reception of Hume has certainly entrenched him in the company of religious skeptics and atheists. From the writing of the Treatise, the ideas of which got him accused of "downright atheism" in 1744, to the atheists of the twentieth century such as A. J. Ayer, Antony Flew, or Richard Dawkins, who find their own principles to be seminal in Hume, if one is truly guilty by association then Hume is the greatest unbeliever of them all.2 The glue that holds this tension between belief and unbelief together appears to be Hume's ultimate rejection of religion rather than his rejection of God. Boswell goes on to report that, even after Hume's apparent confession, Hume still held to his "objection both to devotion and prayer and indeed to everything we commonly call religion, except the practice of morality, and the assent of the understanding to the proposition that God exists."3
Following the idea that Hume did not reject the existence of God, R. J. Butler, in 1960 , proposed belief in God to attain to the level of natural belief in Hume's corpus, meaning that belief in God stands alongside three other "species of natural instincts" that Hume identifies as fundamental beliefs held as preconditions for engagement with the world. Butler agrees that Hume finds no evidence to support belief in God via the a priori or a posteriori; however, he argues, "we commonly act in accordance with belief in design. Therefore, belief in design must be a natural rather than a rational belief."4 According to Butler's argument, Hume recognizes an element of design in the world, even given the multiplicity of ways the analogical design argument is attacked in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Consequently, while cosmological design may not be an idea rationally derived from empirical evidence, design does not, necessarily, count as irrational. Butler argues that Hume could allow design to operate as a non-rational belief that can be taken as natural, meaning that holding on to this belief works out practically in the world and not holding this belief would, in fact, be detrimental. The claim concerning design as a natural belief gets expanded by Butler, "What is interesting in Hume's account, and some would say strange, is that belief in the existence of an ultimate designer and belief in the fact of design come to the same thing."5 Consequently, belief in God should also count as a natural belief.
While accepting some strikingly positive elements of Butler's argument concerning Hume's apparent appreciation of design, J.C.A. Gaskin, author of Hume's Philosophy of Religion, argues convincingly against the notion of expanding this appreciation to the extent of holding God as a natural belief. His critique arises from two points:
1. According to Hume's Natural History of Religion belief in God is not known to be universal. The Natural History reads:
The belief of invisible, intelligent power has been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in all ages; but it has never perhaps been so universal as to admit of no exception, nor has it been, in any degree, uniform in the ideas, which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered, who entertained no sentiments of religion, if travelers and historians may be credited.6 2. Going to the Dialogues and taking Philo as indicative of Hume, Gaskin argues that Philo's discussion of "true religion" in Part XII clearly shows that Philo/Hume does not believe religion capable of adding anything essential to public life that a thoughtful, secular person could not have without it.7 Consequently, Gaskin argues that Butler is right in seeing Hume as a deist of some sort but that Butler is wrong insofar as the non-universality and the non-essential nature of religion show that Hume could not hold belief in God as a natural belief.8
Terence Penelhum also offered, at one time, a natural belief argument, but moved away from that position toward an even harsher judgment of Hume's religious belief. In chapters one and eight of his book, Hume (1975) , and his essay, "Hume's Skepticism and the Dialogues" (1979), Penelhum holds to a similar position as Butler; however, just a few short years later, in 1983, he revises this argument, without completely abandoning the position, in "Natural Belief and Religious Belief in Hume's Philosophy."9 What truly stands out from nearly a decade of arguing some form of Humean natural belief in God is Penelhum's final word on the subject, which arrives in David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System in 1992. Therein, he finds Gaskin's view of an attenuated deism in Hume to be "at least as likely that Hume was, privately, an atheist (though not a dogmatic one) but that he was affected by the sheer weight of conventional opinion that atheism was unthinkable."10 Later, Penelhum appears to settle the issue of the two likelihoods when he declares that Hume simply pays "unreligious lip service to conventional belief."11 This means that the only reason Hume appears to have any faith at all is because the customs of his age did not allow Hume to do otherwise.
Penelhum's last interpretation, though, does not yet reach Paul Russel's recent argument regarding Hume's overtly irreligious aims. Russel argues that the reaction by Hume's contemporaries accusing him of atheism is in right recognition of Hume's attempt to convey his skeptical message, that "his philosophical system has been self-consciously constructed to be independent of any theological commitments."12 Hume's Treatise, while supposedly having had much of its directly irreligious content removed, still conveys, for Russel, the work of a mind intent on undermining arguments contemporary to Hume that attempted to show the reasonableness of religious belief. Once one realizes that Hume's skepticism in the Treatise was ultimately toward the rational justification of religion, his subsequent appeal to naturalism no longer appears in conflict with his skepticism. Going beyond the Treatise and looking at Hume's skeptical approach to religious matters, Russel offers, elsewhere, that Hume should simply be understood as adhering to a "non-dogmatic form of atheism."13
Clearly, there appears to be an ever insistent wave of interpretation that wants to align Hume with an ever more robust unbelief. Nevertheless, as Butler pointed out in his article, Hume was always careful to distinguish between the existence of God, on the one hand, and an understanding of the nature of God on the other, so whereas Hume might indeed have had reservations regarding organized religion, it is far more difficult to interpret him as Penelhum's undogmatic atheist or Russel's irreligious champion.14 Let us observe the sentiment displayed at the very beginning of the Dialogues by Pamphilus:
What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God? . . . But in treating of this obvious and important truth; what obscure questions occur, concerning the nature of the divine Being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? . . . nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction have, as yet, been the result of our most accurate researches.15 I believe that there are too many similar references in Hume's theological writings to declare him to be giving only lip-service to conventional belief. Even in his Natural History, he declares:
The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. But the other question, concerning the origin of religion in human nature, is exposed to some more difficulty. 16 Hume adds later: All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One design prevails throughout the whole.17
Nevertheless, even given these rather positive statements, how are we to place ourselves on the pendulum between Butler's natural belief deism, Gaskin's attenuated assent to deistic arguments, Penelhum's lip-service, and Russel's irreligion?
In the light of Hume studies that have linked Hume more closely with Kant, I will attempt an argument that aligns this paper more closely with Butler's claim that the idea of design is inescapable for Hume. I will not, however, be attempting to show that God attains to the level of natural belief, as Butler argued, for that would assume that the argument can be made from within Hume's own framework. Instead, when one understands the Kantian-like nature implicit in Hume's philosophy, one will notice an overlooked teleological necessity that operates at an a priori level that, once understood, explains why Hume never attacks the idea of the existence of God.18 My argument begins by first showing how Kant and Hume have been previously linked with regard to having similar a priori categories. Both utilize a particular notion of causality in an a priori way. Second, given this link with regard to causality, I argue that the same move can be made with regard to teleology. This necessitates an explication of Kantian teleology, which I give following the arguments of Ginsborg, and how this teleology helps bring about an idea of God. Subsequently, I hope to show convincingly that Hume's own philosophy commits him to a teleological necessity that mirrors Kant's own in the Critique of Judgment. Once so argued, several peculiar statements in the Dialogues will become clear and explain why Hume had to have "some belief."
The Kantian Connection
Even though significant scholarship has been done to tie Hume and Kant together in a positive fashion, I believe there is still some reservation that this connection may amount to an improper anachronism. Kant's awakening from his "dogmatic slumber," which set him on his path to overcome the skepticism he believed he had found in Hume, is well known.19 Kant argued for the a priori-synthetic concept as a way of answering Hume, but Hume's skepticism was not his last word on nature or empiricism. Hume's philosophy attempted to disclose positive possibilities for knowledge as well. Unfortunately, these positive aspects never really caught on, and R. P. Wolff suggests why: "I think the real reason for Hume's failure to get across his very novel suggestions is the fact that they carry him beyond the limits of his own system. Simply because the two systems will be compared and labeled a kind of a priori-synthetic system does not mean that Hume's arrival at such principles follows the same kind of deduction or derivation.23 According to Mall, "Das Humesche Apriori ist, um einen Ausdruck Husserls zu gebrauchen, ein "empirischgebundenes Apriori."24 Whereas Kant derived his categories via the transcendental method, arriving at 18 It is important to note that this argument is only analogous to Butler's insofar as the idea of God is inescapable for Hume; however, because this is essay analogizes Kant and Hume, the outcome of our argument will not raise Hume's belief to the level of natural belief which would necessitate the view that all people will have a belief in God. It simply argues that when one looks at the world in a particular way (as a whole, we shall see) the viewer must succumb to the idea that God exists on account of a teleological a priori -which Hume does. " Kant Studien (1971) : 314. My translation: "In this study it is shown that the system of principles in Hume's philosophy plays a similar role as the Kantian category system. We try to address the principles of Hume and the categories of Kant so that we can speak of a kind of 'a priori-synthetic thinking' in Hume." 23 Ibid., 320. 24 Ibid., 323. My translation: "Hume's a priori is, to use a Husserlian expression, an 'empirically-bound a priori. '" an a priori that is both rational and logical in nature, an a priori principle of Hume "'experimenteller' Natur ist, weil Hume seine Prinzipien mit Hilfe der Methode des 'experimental reasoning' herausstellt."25 Nevertheless, regardless of the different methods of derivation, Mall argues that the principles of Hume and the categories of Kant both condition experience, making it fitting to refer to both systems as a priorisynthetic.
Indeed, Beck's essay, following the general guidelines set down in Mall, argues that Hume actually uses the notion of general causality in an a priori manner similar to Kant. Therein, he argues that Hume finds two notions of causality, "for every event there is some cause" and "same cause same effect," and the first notion, Beck declares, ends up working in a Kantian a priori manner. This means that, according to Beck, Hume's notion of "same cause same effect" is derived from our a posteriori experience in the world while the first notion of "for every event there is some cause" is not derived from experience but orders our experience a priori: "Naturally Hume does not have a theory that one of the conceptions of causation is a priori and the other a posteriori; but a priori is as a priori does, and when a principle is called upon to correct experience, it is functioning in an a priori manner regardless of its origin."26 Now, Mall has tied Hume and Kant together with regard to the general notion of their systems, and Beck has applied that idea to argue for a Kantian style a priori causation in particular, but, as of yet, the argument connecting Hume and Kant with respect to teleology has not been made. We will follow Beck's claim that a priori is as a priori does, meaning that regardless of what a philosopher like Hume might label his ideas, when an idea acts to structure and correct experience, it is functioning as an a priori and deserves to be called such. We will find that Hume's own notion of teleology has a Kantian style a priori element to it, and once so shown it can be argued that Hume's philosophy points beyond his critique to a positive notion of design as well. Addressing this claim demands explication of what, exactly, the Kantian teleological principle is.
Kant on Teleology
Kant gives his most in depth discussion of teleology in the Critique of Judgment, wherein he discusses the power of reflective judgment with respect to taste as well as the comprehension of the heterogeneity found in nature. Commentators have argued that Kant's account of teleology in beauty and his account of teleology in nature are at odds, but Ginsborg, I believe, has the right of it when she argues for continuity between the two. Kant's vocabulary is notoriously inconsistent, and his definition for purposiveness is no exception; nevertheless, Kant defines purposiveness very generally in the Critique of Judgment as the "lawfulness of the contingent" and this broad idea appears to hold together both his aesthetic and natural teleology.27 "Consequently," Ginsborg declares, "he [Kant] takes the possibility of taste to rest on the same a priori principle which he takes to underlie empirical scientific enquiry; namely, the principle that nature is systematically organized in a way that conforms to, or in Kant's terms, is purposive for, our cognitive faculties."28 In other words, our reflective judgment comprehends both judgments of reflective taste and natural determination according to the teleological rule that the experiences that produce these judgments are governed by a recognition of purpose. This particular connection is very important, because we will approach Hume's teleological a priori, first, through aesthetics and then through nature.
Before continuing on, however, we must note that our argument will not end up using teleology to validate the design argument of natural theology by some backdoor method. Kant is just as critical of the argument as Hume is and in similar ways. What Kant's critique makes clear is that the argument from 25 Ibid., 324. My translation: "is experimental in nature, because Hume sets out his principles with the help of the method of 'experimental reasoning.'" 26 Beck, "A Prussian Hume," 126. 27 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §76, 404. In contrast to Ginsborg, Paul Guyer argues that Kant does not have a unifying sense of purposiveness, but rather has two notions: 1. Artifacts have a purpose with respect to a notion of design. 2. Beautiful objects are not, necessarily, designed but only show purpose insofar as they satisfy an aim. See Guyer, Kant and Claims, [213] [214] [215] [216] [217] [218] and Kant and Experience, 417n. 39. 28 Ginsborg, "Reflective Judgment, " 63. intelligent design is insufficient to the task of proving God's existence on a theoretical level. He writes that in order to prove that matter receives its telos, its goal or purpose, from God, we would also have to prove that materials would in themselves be unsuitable for acquiring such order and harmony according to universal laws. But proving this would require bases of proof quite different from those of the analogy with human art. Hence the proof could not establish [the existence of] a creator of the world, to whose idea everything is subjected; but it could establish at best [the existence of] an architect of the world, who would always be greatly limited by the suitability of the material on which he works. 29 Kant clarifies and reinforces this critique in his Critique of Judgment, claiming that the argument from design "cannot reveal to us anything about a final purpose of creation, for it does not even reach the question about such a purpose."30 The problem is that when we make teleological claims about processes in nature, our understanding of nature's purpose cannot transcend the physical world because our judgments of purpose are rooted in our knowledge of human artifice.
However, a careful reading of Kant's Critique of Judgment, even a reading through his criticism of physicotheology, should cause people to pause over some of his remarks with regard to teleology. Kant declares that an intelligent cause of the world is the "only suitable concept," keeping in mind that this intelligent cause does not, for Kant, rise to the level of theological significance.31 This remark is the result of Kant's view that he espouses in the rest of the Critique of Judgment that human beings think in a teleological way. Kant argues:
the concept of purposiveness that nature displays in its products must be one that, while not pertaining to the determination of objects themselves, is nevertheless a subjective principle that reason has for our judgment, since this principle is necessary for human judgment in dealing with nature.32
The observation of nature clearly discloses a set of natural laws that appear to govern the contingent objects of the world. However, these natural laws do not have another law that governs them such that they may be considered as part of a unified whole. The unification of natural laws is, for Kant, the product of our own subjective judgment, and this judgment regards according to purpose. While teleological judgment is subjective on the one hand, human investigators may rightly proclaim teleological conclusions to be objective because all human judgment must operate according to this human regulative principle.33 Not only does the a priori concept subjectively regulate all nature as lawful, but it also orders that lawfulness in such a way that the order is recognizable as beautiful. Consequently, in describing the method of teleological judgment, Kant argues that mechanistic explanations of nature must be subordinated to teleological judgment. Regardless of how well an investigator may be able to detail the mechanism that brought about a state of affairs, the very recognition that the state of affairs has organization at all is the product of teleological reasoning. 34 Kant's essay entitled "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?" was written in 1786 and prefigures his argument in the Critique of Judgment concerning what teleological reasoning means for belief in God. Purposive, natural reasoning is a subjective condition of reason, which may appear to some to be less important to argumentation than objective principles; however, Kant believes that to orient oneself correctly, one must use subjective principles when objective principles are insufficient.35 Under the subjective principles of purpose, human beings do not have any rational justification for thinking about spiritual beings in nature, but with regard to a singular author of nature, reason demands to think its existence: For not only does our reason already feel a need to take the concept of the unlimited as the ground of the concepts of all limited beings -hence of all other things, but this need even goes as far as the presupposition of its existence, without which one can provide no satisfactory ground at all for the contingency of the existence of things in the world, let alone for the purposiveness and order which is encountered everywhere in such a wondrous degree (in the small, because it is close to us, even more than in the large).36
This concession does not follow the presentation of a teleological argument because it does not move from perceived order to a teleological principle to a declaration about the existence of God. For Kant, the very subjective purposiveness that exists as condition of the human being's natural awareness demands the postulation that God exists in order to account for the purposiveness that the subject's reason sees in the world. Natural order does not demand a God because that order might always be explained by another element in nature, but rational purposiveness, which sees all of nature in its entirety as purposed, does demand the idea of God. Now, as long as the subject attempts to declare why a particular object has some apparent design, mechanical explanations may be preferable. Nevertheless, when one theoretically considers first causes of everything contingent, in its entirety, God becomes a necessary idea: "we must assume the existence of God if we want to judge about the first causes of everything contingent, chiefly in the order of ends which is actually present in the world."37
God, as contemplated in the Orientation essay, is not given any religious or theological significance by Kant, yet it is toward this theological significance that the Critique of Judgment further presses us. The condition of teleological a priori, which somehow fails to produce a theological basis for God, does start one on a path toward beginning to think ultimate questions. Having understood that the mechanistic understanding of nature is subordinated to the teleological such that the idea of a natural end "necessarily leads to the idea of all of nature as a system in accordance with the rule of ends," one may begin to philosophize about higher ends in nature, which Kant names the ultimate end and the final end.38 The former takes place within nature and, as such, cannot lead thought past natural ideas, but the second takes place outside of nature. Kant writes, "A final purpose is a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility . . . and nature would therefore be incapable of achieving it and producing it in accordance with the idea of this purpose."39 Kant recognizes the human being's freedom as the mark of an unconditioned being and our moral nature as the highest purpose of existence: "for the moral principle that determines us to action is supersensible. Hence it is the only possible [thing] in the order of purposes that is absolutely unconditioned as concerns nature, and hence alone qualifies man, the subject of morality, to be the final purpose of creation to which all of nature is subordinated."40 In Kant's hands, teleology may not be able to produce a viable argument for the existence of God for theological purposes, but following teleology from its seat as an a priori condition of reason through its superior position to mechanistic explanation to its revelation of humanity as final purpose has certainly pushed thought toward the idea of God -and Kant agrees. "Physical teleology does induce us to look for a theology," even if teleology, by itself, is incapable of producing a theological system of any kind.41 Kant ends his section on physicotheology in the Critique of Judgment with the claim that "it is of no use to theology except as a preliminary (a propaedeutic)."42 The word "except" should not be overlooked here! Kant's earlier critique of the teleological argument now clearly appears as intended for those who desired to take the argument from design and turn it into a proof for a particular, religious conception of God. Nature's purposiveness surely cannot produce any such thing. Nevertheless, teleology propels us to look for a theology. It is preliminary, and Kant argues that "if the cognition of natural ends is connected with that of the moral end" then "it is of great significance for assisting the practical reality of the idea [ Once we connect Hume to a teleological a priori in like manner, it will become apparent that his philosophy also demands the idea of God, even if Hume is unwilling to allow the idea to propel him to look for a theology as well. We will first see that Kant's notion of the a priori as a form of intuition that structures experience such that the intuition necessarily displays the a priori as a feature of the phenomenal world occurs in an analogous manner in Hume. The connection herein will involve teleological necessity. This teleological link is best seen in Hume's aesthetics. Just as Kant discloses an aesthetic a priori that sees the form of objects as purposefully for producing pleasure from beauty, Hume's aesthetics will reveal a similar purposiveness evidenced in a natural orientation toward beauty. Kant argues, even in the Critique of Judgment, with Hume's perceived skepticism as his object.44 The force of the third Critique is to prove that one's subjective intuition of beauty is universally valid as long as the subjective judgment is following the aesthetic a priori structure of intuition. Given time, this structure would correct misguided judgments. Hume, then, could be said to have a similar teleological a priori if he shows a basic structure of intuition that sees objects as for aesthetic pleasure. If this structure also ends up correcting misguided claims, then we will satisfy what Beck modelled in his essay.
Hume and his Teleological Principle
Recovering a positive reading of teleology for Hume begins with his view of aesthetics and his own recognition of a problem with his philosophy of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism holds that beauty is not a property of an object but is only subjectively recognized as beauty by the perceiver. If the recognition of beauty belongs only to the subject, can anyone believe that anything is beautiful or do aesthetic judgments admit of something normative? For Kant, because judgment was regulated by certain a priori concepts, a subjective claim could be held to be objectively valid for others, and while Hume does not declare there to be any such a priori ideas, he clearly makes the claim that some sentimental, aesthetic judgments are better than others. Famously, Hume declares:
Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays any attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous. 45 Nevertheless, for someone who has already declared that beauty is not an objectively measurable property, arguing for a normative standard must focus upon some form of subjective, regulative concept.
Hume begins to define this normative standard by reference to our healthy natural state: "In each creature, there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and sentiment."46 Reminiscent of much of Hume's positive natural philosophy, whatever it is that produces in us an appropriate aesthetic judgment depends upon our own nature. The rest of Hume's work on taste outlines ways in which a right functioning nature may be thrown off, giving him a list of guidelines to follow for good judgment.
For Hume, there are five basic virtues that a good critic of beauty must possess. First, the critic must have "delicate" taste, which enables the making of proper distinctions in the experience of beautiful objects. Second, these distinctions cannot be made, though, without practice, and Hume advocates training aesthetic sensibility lest judgments be confusing and hesitant. For the third virtue, practice must occur over a broad range of experiences such that proper comparisons can be made. Fourth, whatever prejudice a critic may possess that could skew proper judgment must be eliminated, and, finally, Hume broadly encourages the critic to have good sense, which helps ensure the proper application of the previous four virtues. While these five accomplishments certainly measure up to what common sense would describe as a capable critic, they do not, in any way shape or form, assure us of a normative, critical standard. Nevertheless, Hume clearly declares that certain aesthetic judgments are good while others are absurd. The question that is left follows: if Hume's five virtues of a good critic fail to produce a normative standard in the area of food, why should anyone believe that they should produce a normative standard in the area of aesthetics?47 Zangwill argues that most Humean commentators never see past these basic principles of taste, and, in so doing, these commentators cannot account for normative taste.48 "But in fact," Zangwill claims, "Hume's techniques all presuppose a certain thesis, which, if correct, would underwrite them all. There is an aspect of Hume's account which the commentators have missed. And in missing it, they have missed what is most interesting and powerful in Hume's account."49
In order to disclose what has been overlooked, he begins with three quotes from Hume, each of which connects the critic's judgment of an object with a natural aptness of the object to produce aesthetic pleasure:
There are certain qualities in objects which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.50
Some particular forms or qualities, from their original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ.51 Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to give pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt.52
In these quotes, we see that objects are, in some way, naturally apt to produce feelings of aesthetic pleasure, and these objects are calculated as pleasurable on account of the particular structure of the mind. Sentiments of pleasure, those "particular feelings" which had often been equated with beauty, now become the mark of the causal relationship between an object that appears as having the tendency to produce aesthetic pleasure and the perceiver who is naturally structured for realizing the object's tendency.53 Essentially, Zangwill argues that Hume has an underlying teleological account behind his normative, aesthetic claims, such that when a particular object is encountered by someone who follows the basic five principles of judgment, that person's aesthetic sensibility is already naturally structured for seeing the object as beautiful. In a response article, A. T. Nuyen agrees with Zangwill with regard to teleology: "I have not tried to argue that we should not read Hume's theory of taste as a teleological account. Indeed, I have conceded that there is considerable textual support for this reading."54 Both agree that Hume appears to be relying on a teleological underpinning; however, both contest that this underpinning would, in fact, create 47 Zangwill, "Hume, Taste," 155. 48 The primary issue with trying to relate a standard of taste to the five virtues of a critic arises in the form of a vicious circle. Hume begins his discovery of the qualities of the critic by discussing a small sample of artistic works. Those who identify these works as proper masterpieces must be the good critics. These good critics who have properly identified the good art have identifiable virtues, but it is these critics employing their identifiable virtues who determine what the best art is. See Gracyk, "Rethinking," 175. A teleological underpinning, which is argued as being present, would be the original ground of any aesthetic work. Human beings are naturally apt to see certain objects as beautiful. Because beautiful objects are a given, so recognized by natural aptitude, the virtues of a good critic can then be deduced. Any circle that ensues would be the ever refinement of the taste of a good critic rather than a vicious circle on account of having a starting point. 49 Ibid., 156. 50 Hume, "Standard of Taste," 235. 51 Ibid., 232. 52 Ibid., 234. 53 One can find similar statements in the Treatise regarding the object's natural tendency, which places Hume's aesthetic theory already beyond mere sentimentalism. See Hume's Treatise, 576: "The object which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect," and "any object [which] has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor ... is always regarded as beautiful." While one can argue that these quotes merely state that objects that cause pleasure are considered beautiful, when Hume adds the idea that recognition of this causality is rooted in a natural fittedness, then the sense of the a priori becomes clear. The objects cause pleasure because they are fit to that purpose. 54 Nuyen, "Hume," 65. a normative standard. Their true disagreement appears to be the manner in which Hume's teleology fails the normative standard.
Both Zangwill and Nuyen take time to argue why a teleological underpinning would not, in fact, create the normativity that Hume desires to find in his essay. For Zangwill, the linchpin of the issue turns on the verifiability of those qualities that Hume declares to be virtues. On the one hand, he already recognizes that the virtues do not provide a standard, but, on the other hand, Zangwill argues that the teleological standard does not show why these virtues are truly virtuous for the critic. Nuyen answers this charge from Zangwill's own argument before introducing his own question. If the teleological account is correct, then the virtues are quite easily accounted for. Teleology provides us with "a prior grasp of the normativity of aesthetic judgments," in which case the five virtues of a good critic are those operations of the mind that help to recognize better certain experiences as producing aesthetic pleasure.55 Unfortunately, this only allows Nuyen to introduce another problem for teleology. Nuyen's critique builds off of a naturalistic claim made by Zangwill, who states that Hume's teleology would be "naturally supplemented by an evolutionary account," showing the affinity so many Hume scholars have for scientific naturalism.56 With this in place, Nuyen asks what adaptive advantage a teleological aesthetic would have and finds none. " [W] ithout an adaptiveness story to underpin the teleological 'ought', the teleological, sentimentalist account is exposed to the naturalistic fallacy because it is really saying that a judgment is aesthetically sound just because it has withstood the test of time, that something is beautiful just because that is what opinions converge on."57 Without any advantage, he argues that normativity must be found elsewhere. Interestingly, if this teleological ought is read in a Kantian, a priori way, both Zangwill's and Nuyen's critique falls away.
Following Mall, Wolfe, and Beck's example regarding causation, the teleology found in Hume is best understood in terms of an a priori condition that surely goes beyond Hume's own claims. The first evidence that such a condition is at work appears with the realization that aesthetic claims do not rely upon some set of derived principles. Ovid and Milton will be appreciated as beautiful by many throughout history who have no idea of the deftness of their poetic abilities. "The possibility of standards of taste rests on the brute fact that we 'naturally' respond in similar ways to the same objects. If our 'internal fabric' were different, the works of Ovid and Milton would have as little value as a scientific text propounding a discarded theory."58 Just so, as Zangwill has pointed out, Hume returns to a need for recognition of natural aptness, a recognition that the object appears to be for aesthetic pleasure. Indeed, a priori is as a priori does. Nuyen already touches on this when he responds to Zangwill's major critique. The teleological ought does give us an a priori sense of the beautiful, which leads to an uncovering of Hume's virtues for the critic, successfully undermining Zangwill's concerns that teleology does not provide normative force in Hume's aesthetics.
Nuyen's critique demands that a natural inclination be followed by an adaptive advantage in order to meet the naturalist reading given by Zangwill. There certainly does not seem to be one. It is clear why a person should recognize meat to be of proper color and smell to help ensure that the meat will be healthy to eat, but recognizing the sunset as beautiful hardly helps one adapt to an environmental niche. Failing this, the naturalistic fallacy appears in place: something is supposed to be beautiful because people have always seen it as beautiful. However, if Hume's teleology is read along the lines of a Kantian a priori then there is no need to explain aesthetics in terms of natural adaptation. The teleological "ought" that declares certain things to be beautiful and others not is not a description by Hume of how others should judge; it is the standard by which judging is simply done. Even if some critics deviate from this standard, history will self-correct the problem:
The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME two thousand years ago, is still admired at PARIS and LONDON. All the changes of climate, government, religion, and language, have not been able to obscure his glory. Authority or prejudice may give a temporary vogue to a bad poet or orator; but his reputation will never be durable or general. . . . On the contrary, a real genius, the longer his works endure, and the more wide they are spread, the more sincere is the admiration which he meets with. Envy and jealousy have too much place in a narrow circle. . . . But when these obstructions are removed, the 55 Ibid., 64. 56 Zangwill, "Hume, Taste," 157. 57 Nuyen, "Hume," 65. 58 Gracyk, "Hume and Kant". beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiments, immediately display their energy; and while the world endures, they maintain their authority over the minds of men.59
The historical reception of something as beautiful is not, as Nuyen claims, a reason to accept the object as beautiful; it is the evidence that those objects that are "naturally fitted" to bring aesthetic pleasure simply do, and when bad poets and orators are given accolades for a brief time, the teleological principle of Hume's aesthetics corrects the bad judgment in time, which is the point of an a priori, as Beck noted.
Hume's Teleology in the Dialogues
At this moment, the teleological underpinning of Hume's aesthetic is not at the general level of Kant's philosophy of teleology. The question at hand is whether or not the former should be expanded into the latter. As far as Hume and Kant's aesthetics go, a Humean teleology goes a long way to connecting these two philosophers with respect to beauty. Kant's aesthetics also relies on a general suitability of objects to be recognized as beautiful, and this suitability he recognizes as a teleological purposiveness, the finality of the object's aesthetic value. On this view, Hume's natural aptness that begins out of the structure of the mind appears remarkably similar to Kant's a priori notion, but is there any evidence that Hume's notion of nature in general is teleologically ordered?
If we put everything together from Hume's teleological aesthetic to Kant's lawful purposiveness that regulates nature and read the Dialogues with these in mind, several of Hume's statements that have been taken to be either odd or not indicative of Hume's own beliefs take on a new meaning and give an indication that Hume's teleology covers much more than aesthetics. First, let us look at the argument of Cleanthes, the character in the Dialogues that supports the argument from design:
Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of design.60
This argument from Cleanthes would fit in well with any of the natural theologians of Hume's day; however, there are some very interesting Humeanisms in this excerpt. The broader context of this citation finds Cleanthes and Philo, Hume's skeptical character, arguing about how one might rationally argue for the analogy between apparent design and designer, but this particular passage from Cleanthes does not rely upon coming to rational conclusions. Instead of appealing to Philo's reason, Cleanthes asks Philo about his feelings, which fits better with Hume's aesthetics than with his positive account of ideas. This feeling, however, is not just some wishy-washy emotional response but, rather, the generator of an idea that hits with the force of a sensation. This final part to the passage brings to mind Hume's own empirical criterion of meaning, which states that all of our ideas must find their origin in sense-impressions in order for the ideas to be counted as meaningful. Cleanthes uses this Humean language to describe the impact of a feeling one has when looking at the order of nature; it carries with it the force of a sense impression, making the very idea of a contriver meaningful. Given the immense amount of work Hume does in the Dialogues divorcing the idea of order and design, we have to ask how such a meaningful idea could possibly arise as a subjective feeling. Here again, we must go beyond Hume's philosophy and suggest that something like a teleological a priori is at work. Some order is found in nature, when considering the eye, but our human experience of this order, according to Cleanthes, responds by producing a feeling as strong as sensation that not only is there order but also design. A priori is as a priori does.
Immediately, those who wish to keep the argument from design as buried as possible would point out that Cleanthes is the mouthpiece for the design argument, and Hume has done an admirable job of presenting a strong teleological argument instead of presenting a straw man. This makes it all the more convincing when Philo's skepticism chips away at Cleanthes until only an absurd notion of design is left. However, at this very point in the narrative, after Cleanthes has argued how irresistible the design argument is to the mind, Philo remains silent. Norman Kemp-Smith suggests that this silence is the result of Philo biding his time in order to lay groundwork for his triumph in Part XII.61 Such an interpretation of the events in the Dialogues is interesting given the fact that the narrator offers a reason for Philo's silence: "Here I could observe that Philo was a little embarrassed and confounded."62 Surely, Philo, the skeptic of the work, could not truly have a soft spot for Cleanthes's argument?
Interestingly, the direction of the argument in the Dialogues takes a turn at the end of Part X where Philo declares that he is about to triumph over Cleanthes, but before his so-called victory, he admits:
Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my skeptical and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms.63 This statement from Philo is almost indistinguishable from the previous statement of Cleanthes except for the added emphasis on final causes, reminding us of Kant's own claims in the Orientation essay. Again, the conclusion that nature exhibits intelligence and design does not arise from empirical evidence but from an irresistible force that strikes us with regard to nature's beauty and fitness. A clearer definition of Hume's aesthetic teleology could not be made, and now it is being applied to natural causal laws. Rather than using nature to make an argument based on observable facts, Philo confesses finding beauty in the teleological aptness of nature that makes rational argument against design to be nothing more than "cavils and sophisms." Once again, a priori is as a priori does.
With regard to Philo's triumph, his argument at the end of Part XII fails to undermine the idea of design even though it adequately undermines the use of the design argument for theology. Nevertheless, Philo sums up the conclusion to their conversation by declaring "The whole of natural theology . . . resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence."64 In the wake of all of the arguing, Philo cannot help but contend that the universe, despite his protests, still looks designed.
For those following the insistence of a greater and greater irreligious Hume, rather than emphasizing the concession on the part of the atheist that the world has evidence of intelligent design, they emphasize the remoteness of the analogy. Russel argues in that fashion: the atheist can concede that there is some remote analogy between the first principle of the universe and several other parts of nature-only one of which is human thought and mind (D, 12.7/218; and cp. 7 .1/176-7). Hume's point is that there are other analogies that are no less plausible than that which Cleanthes has suggested. These other analogies do not suggest that the cause of this world is something like mind or human intelligence. Clearly, then, the atheist may concede that there is some remote analogy between God and human minds and still insist that there remain other analogies and hypotheses that are no less plausible. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that all such analogies are so weak and 'remote' that God's nature remains an 'inexplicable mystery' well beyond the scope of human understanding (D, 12.33/227; cp. NHR, 15.13).65 Let us offer two responses to this line of argument. 1. First, we should be careful not to overemphasize the equivalence of Philo's arguments with Hume's considered philosophy such that every word from Philo is understood as Hume's best argument on the subject. Consider Hume's own words in his March 10, 1751 letter to Gilbert Elliott, where he writes, "I make Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue. Any propensity you imagine I have to the other side, crept in upon me against my will: Ant it is not long ago that I burned an old 61 Kemp-Smith argues, "the issues thus raised [by Cleanthes] are so different from those involved in the argument from design, in its intellectualist form, and are so much more complex, that Philo is careful not to attempt any kind of reply at this stage. He prepares the way by much preliminary discussion; and it is not until the very close of the Dialogues, in Part XII, that he proceeds to answer the question which Cleanthes propounds." See Appendix D, "Critical Analysis," Dialogues, 104. 62 Hume, Dialogues, 155. 63 Ibid., 202. 64 Ibid., 227. 65 Russel, "Hume on Religion." manuscript book, wrote before I was twenty; which contained, page after page, the gradual progress of my thoughts on that head. It began with an anxious search after arguments, to confirm the common opinion: Doubts stole in, dissipated, returned, were again dissipated, returned again; and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination, perhaps against reason."66 Note that it seems that Hume's doubts come from his imagination rather than inclination and even, perhaps, "against reason." This would make Philo's statements here the words of the "careless skeptic" who has already admitted that his questions in this vein are "cavils and sophisms." Second, while Russel's point is certainly arguable, the reading of this passage in the Dialogues could just as easily be given a positive reading. From earlier in this passage, Philo argues that "from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of nature, in every situation and in every age."67 All the operations of nature, one could argue, bear the stamp of the creator rather than argue that the multiple operations obfuscate the creator.
There is also, however, one other response we can give to those who would weaken Philo's admission of design. This admission is precisely what we would expect to see coming from a Kantian styled reason, which Hume appears to have with regard to teleology. In the Orientation essay Kant argued that the idea of a designer only arose for those who attempted to cognize the "first cause of everything contingent." Philo's acquiescence to Cleanthes does not attend contemplation of the eye, the example which Cleanthes felt rendered the designer practically self-evident. Rather, only when Philo considers the "cause or causes of the universe" does he make his concession. Hume, we have seen, has already made a similar concession in his Natural History when admitting that the "whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author." Following Kant, then, we would expect that only those whose a priori teleological idea has arisen with the proper attention to experience would be faced with the inescapable idea of God, and Hume, even in the voice of skeptical Philo, arrives at the very same conclusion.68
Conclusion
With regard to where we are to find ourselves on the pendulum between Butler, Gaskin, and Penelhum, let us now draw conclusions about Hume based upon our comparison of Kant's use of teleology in the Critique of Judgment and the Orientation essay and what has been argued with respect to an a priori teleology in Hume. First, Butler's essay argued for teleology as a natural idea, which met with some support, but when he attempted to equate this stance with a natural belief in God, he met with expected resistance. Drawing comparisons between Hume's use of teleology in aesthetics and then in nature and Kant's use of teleology reinforces Butler's idea that Hume can truly be said to hold to design as something like a natural belief. The comparison is tempered because in order to claim that Hume has an inescapable idea of God inherent in his philosophy we have had to utilize the Kantian a priori in an anachronistic manner. This comparison, however, does not, immediately, allow the simple equation that Butler made between design and designer, but Kant's argument in the Orientation essay will allow us to make this step. For Kant, it was not necessary to ask questions concerning final causes of the whole of nature, but if one did, then the result was the need to presuppose the existence of God. Hume appears to be right in line in the Dialogues regarding this outcome. Even though his own work seems to undermine the conclusion that design leads to the idea of a designer, Hume, himself, cannot escape the idea that God exists. Perhaps, though, this last claim leads to one last hurdle.
Is the inescapable idea of God enough for belief? Do we need something more like an objective proof before we assent to the proposition that God exists? As we saw in the beginning while reading Hume in a nonironic fashion, Hume appears to grant God's existence while questioning whether or not anything can be positively known about the attributes of God. Kant, on the other hand, declares in the Critique of Pure Reason that God should be understood as the "substratum of all possibility" but this understanding only reaches the level of a "subjectively necessary hypothesis."69 The inability to raise the subjectively necessary to the objectively certain in addition to Kant's critique of the ontological, cosmological, and physicotheological proofs of God led some commentators to characterize Kant's philosophy as directly opposed to theistic or even deistic beliefs. 70 The positive developments regarding God in Kant's moral argument appeared to show that while God's objective existence is not proven, the attributes of God's moral nature are clearly derivable. Kant's position on God (unknown existence, derivable qualities) stands in stark contrast to the position Hume seems to take in the Dialogues (known existence, underivable qualities).
Allen Wood, however, explains that Kant's subjective hypothesis is part of the "positive side of Kant's rational theology" and that acknowledging this hypothesis as necessary shows that the "concept of God is natural to human reason."71 Simply because one has a belief in God that is only subjectively sufficient does not mean that one's faith is merely opinion. In point of fact, a person has a rational faith, according to Kant, when that faith is justified by reasons that are "valid for everyone." More and more scholars are taking up Kant again with greater recognition of the positive aspect of his philosophy of religion. Rather than seeing Kant's critique of the traditional proofs for God's existence as "world-crushing" as Mendelssohn described it, scholars are recognizing a more affirming approach in Kant.72 "The traditional arguments, being theoretical, would not provide a suitable theological basis for religion, even if they succeeded." 73 Success would imply having a theoretical knowledge of God, which could lead to the human attempt to utilize that knowledge for the purpose of controlling God. What remains as evidence for God allows one to have a rationally defensible faith without attaining to the level of theoretical knowledge. Hume's philosophy, analogously constructed, would find the idea of God just as unavoidable.
In light of the overlap between ideas, let us look at one last connection between Kant and Hume in these matters. If Hume's philosophy mirrors Kant's with respect to the way God is rationally formulated, we should expect that their views with respect to the way the idea of God affects humanity should also be similar, and they show remarkable similarity here as well. For Kant, whether or not the idea of God leads to an actual, possible, or non-referent, Kant's moral theology still argues that the idea of God only places on human beings an onus to follow the moral law already within us. As we saw earlier in the discussion between Hume and Boswell, Hume would eject everything that had to do with religion except for morality and the understanding that God exists. It would certainly appear that there exists an inescapable deism for Hume.
